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INTRODUCTION 
 
On November 5, 2002, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) handed down a series of 
judgments against eight European Union (EU) Member States concerning the bilateral air 
service agreements between the Member States and the United States (U.S.). Brought to
the ECJ by the European Commission in 1998, the ruling concerned the competence 
division between the EU Member States and the European Commission in the area of 
international air transport. While the Member States traditionally have exclusive 
authority over international air service negotiations, the European Union had gained 
considerable competence over internal aviation matters during the integration of the 
European aviation market in the 1990s. While the ruling maintained that the Member 
States had exclusive competence over external air transport negotiations, it did find 
several items negotiated in those agreements in conflict with the provisions of the 
European Communities (EC) Treaty. The so-called “nationality clause” negotiated in the 
air service agreements, it argued, is, in principle, a community competence, as are articles 
relating to computer reservation systems and intra-EU tariffs in “open skies” agreements.  
The ECJ ruling is in many ways a landmark decision that was long awaited by 
practitoners and observers of international air transport. Overall, the reception of the 
ruling was very positive. Policymakers and airlines in Brussels, the Member States, and 
even the United States agree that it was a fair and well thought out decision. Within days 
of the judgments, however, it became clear that everybody thought so for different 
reasons. While the European Commission warmly welcomed the ruling as a landmark 
“victory” for community aviation, the Member States and the United States felt that the 
thrust of the ruling confirmed the authority of individual countries over international 
negotiations. For the Commission, the ECJ decision inevitably implied the complete 
restructuring of international aviation affairs within the EU, while the Member States and 
especially the United States argued that only some minor modifications would bring the 
existing agreements in line with EC law.  
These opposing visions collided in a series of policy statements. On the day of the 
ruling, the Commission issued a press rel ase welcoming the decision. Transport 
Commissioner Loyola de Palacio declared, “[T]oday’s judgment is a major step towards 
developing a new coherent and dynamic European policy for international aviation […]. 
The Commission stands ready to play its part.”1 The UK government was quickest to 
react, stating cautiously they did not share the Commission’s interpretation. It argued that 
the Member States no longer had the competence to renegotiate the clauses in question, 
so long as they complied with the relevant provisions of EC law. The United States 
Department of State issued a similar statement in late November and U.S. Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State Jeffrey Shane underlined in a public appearance on 
November 8, 2002 that the Unit d States was willing to renegotiate the elements in 
question with the individual Member States. To Jeffrey Shane, the ECJ decision “did not 
have an immediate impact on the rights of U.S. or European airlines.”2   
                                            
1 European Commission (2002) “Open sky agreements: Commission welcomes European Court of 
Justice ruling,” Press Release IP/02/1609, Brussels, November 5, 
<http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh>.  
2 Shane, Jeffrey, 2002: Open Skies Agreements and the European Court of Justice. Paper presented at 
conference on American Bar Association, Washington, D.C., November 8.
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Insisting on its original interpretation, the Commission put forward a communiqué on 
November 19.3 To underline the urgency of reorganization, Loyola de Palacio requested 
that all operations under the agreements in question be suspended until the Commission 
had the mandate to renegotiate the articles in question. This request was quite radical. 
Airlines and policymakers both in the Member States and the United States were in 
disbelief. In the words of an U.S. airline representative, this meant annulling “billion 
dollar operations.”4 From a very practical point of view, denouncing the existing 
agreements was simply not possible and, moreover, was in no one’s interest. The request 
made such waves throughout the aviation community that Loyola de Palacio chose to 
assure the Association of European Airlines (AEA) unofficially that her request did not 
intend to hurt business operations but had been meant for rhetorical purposes.5 Similarly, 
the European Commission’s Delegation in Washington, D.C. spent much time and effort 
reassuring their U.S. counterparts that this should not be considered a hostile act against 
the United States.6  
However, when U.S. representative traveled to Europe to meet with representatives of 
the Member States, the conflict continued. While the U.S. government had made an effort 
to come up with new clauses that would meet the ECJ’s requirements, the Commission 
was quite displeased that the Unit d States continued to seek negotiations with the 
Member States on the issues in question and had appeared at the meeting without 
invitation. The Commission furthermore criticized the U.S. proposals as minimalist and 
insufficient.7 To the U.S. government officials, these reactions were difficult to 
understand. They considered that they had shown their willingness to renegotiate the air 
service agreements and had made a concerted effort to help the Member States on the 
articles in question. In the eyes of a U.S. observer, the Commission seemed “like a child 
screaming for attention” at a time when the United States just wanted to assure the 
smooth continuation of business operations.8   
What had led to the collision between the European Commission and the United 
States? Was the core a true misunderstanding over the interpretation of the ECJ ruling or 
were both the Commission’s actions and the United States’ response part of a larger game 
of power politics? This paper argues that the present situation results from both different 
perceptions of the current regulatory situation in Europe and the European Commission’s 
strategy for furthering integration in aviation within Europe. The Commission is keen on 
completing the integration of air transport services in Europe, from which external 
negotiations have so far been excluded. Since the Member States have for a long time 
been hesitant to grant this mandate, the Commission had to prove to the Member States 
the value added of making external negotiations a community competence. Relations 
with the United States are of crucial component of this argument. The rationale behind 
the actions of the Commission is that if the Commission can convincingly argue that the 
United States benefits more from the current arrangements than does the EU, that 
                                            
3 CEC, 2002: Communication from the Commission on the consequences of the Court judgement of 5 
November 2002 for European air transport policy. COM (2002) 649 final. November 19. Brussels: 
European Commission. <http://europa.eu.int/comm/transport/air/international/doc/com_2003_94_en.pdf> 
4 Interview in Washington on April 29, 2003.  
5 Interview in the Brussels on December 5, 2002.  
6 Interview in Washington, D.C. on April 15, 2003.  
7 Interview with a U.S. government representative in Washington, D.C. on March 12, 2003. 
8 Interview with a US airline representative in Washington, D.C. on April 29, 2003.  
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Member States are too fragmented to bring about change, and that the Unite  St tesis 
uncooperative, then a community mandate on negotiations with the United States might 
actually become a necessity. This paper will explain the evolution of this Commission 
position and the strategy behind it. The recent clash is nonetheless aggravated by a true 
misunderstanding about the state of air transport in the EU. While the U.S. vision is 
oriented towards the past in order to keep operations going as usual, the EU (not only the 
Commission) is looking towards the future to complete the restructuring of its internal 
aviation market.  
The analysis of this paper is based on 26 semi-directed interviews with government 
representatives, airlines, and aviation experts from the United States and the European 
Union.9 Carried out between September 2002 and May 2003, the interviews have been 
used to categorize and complement policy statements and other primary and secondary 
documentation on this subject.  
After giving a brief overview of the particular regulatory context of international air 
transport, the paper compares the positions of the United States and Europe towards
further liberalization. A third section then analyses the activism of the European 
Commission towards greater community competence and a more open transatlantic 
aviation regime. In conclusion, the paper makes several recommendations to U.S. and EU 
policymakers for a more promising continuation of common EU-U.S. aviation project. 
 
1. THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN INTERNATI ONAL AVIATION  
 
Because of the distances covered, aviation has, from the very beginning, been an 
international industry. The regulation of trade in air traffic services started almost a 
century ago. Touching upon a large number of security and defense concerns, commerce 
in aviation traditionally has been negotiated bilaterally between governments. The 
following section gives a brief overview of the history and characteristics of global air 
transport.   
 
1.1. The old system 
After several previous negotiated agreements between 1910 and WWII, the present 
regime of international air transport was put into place in 1944 at the International Civil 
Aviation Conference in Chicago. Bilaterally negotiated air service agreements constitute 
its foundation and represent a tight and heavy network of regulation. With the goal of 
achieving the highest possible degree of uniformity in regulations, procedures, and 
organization of civil aviation, the “Chicago Convention”10 furthermore set up a 
permanent organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Its 
mission is to oversee and assure cooperation in and standardization of international 
aviation.11 ICAO is a purely intergovernmental organization with 188 member countries 
                                            
9 Most interviews have been one hour to one and a half hours long and include the U.S. Departments of 
State, Transport and Commerce, the U.S. Congress, the European Commission and its Delegation i  
Washington, D.C., representatives from the German and U.K. government, the American Air Transport 
Association, the Airline Pilots Association, the Association of European Airlines, United, Delta and 
American Airlines, Lufthansa, Air France, British Airways and KLM, the World Trade Organisation and 
the OECD, as well as several other policy observers.  
10 ICAO Doc. 7300/8 (8th edition 2000). 
11 A comprehensive history of ICAO can be found on its web site http://www.icao.int.  
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as of January 1, 2003. The airline industry organized itself in a separate forum, the 
International Air Transport Association (IATA), founded out of a smaller association in 
Havana, Cuba in 1945. The role of the producers’ organization IATA deserves special 
attention. In a 1946 service agreement between the United Kingdom (UK) and the United 
States – called Bermuda I – ATA became designated as the organization tasked with 
fixing tariffs on UK-U.S. flights. Even though such producer price-fixing was illegal in 
the United States, ubsequent bilateral agreements between other countries specified 
similar procedures and made IATA the machinery for setting fares and rates among 
international airlines.  
For the business of international air transport, the tight network of air service 
agreements is decisive. As of the end of 2002, 2054 bilateral agreements have been 
registered with ICAO. Counting all informal exchanges, additions, and wr ti g, one 
observer has even estimated the total number of bilateral agreements to be as high as 
10,000.12 The traffic rights negotiated between governments in the bilateral air service 
agreements cover a large number of details, including points to be served, r ut s to be 
operated, types of traffic to be carried, capacity, tariffs and tariff conditions, designation 
of airlines as well as their ownership and control. This last item is one of the most 
important ones, because it traditionally requires an airlin  designated by a country to be 
effectively owned or controlled by it. In other words, the U.S. government can only 
designate U.S. carriers and the German government only German carriers. Effective 
ownership is defined in the United States as less than 25 percent foreign ownership, 
across the EU as less than 49 percent. Within the current framework, no airline can make 
seemingly simple business decisions of increasing its flight offers, targeting a new 
destination, soliciting foreign investment or relocating its headquarters.  
 
1.2. Internal deregulation in the United States and the EU  
Within individual countries, economic regulation was the rule. In the United States, 
the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), established in 1938, controlled entry, exit, tariffs and 
subsidies of airlines in the domestic markets. Even twenty years later, after the creation of 
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), who took over the regulation of security 
standards, the CAB remained in place for economic regulation. Since air services were 
thus under the exclusive control of a governmental agency, even general competition 
policy – i.e. antitrust law – did not apply to the sector. Similar regulation was the 
standard throughout the world. 
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, criticism of the rigidity and the inefficiency of 
the system began to grow, drawing from an unusual coalition of consumerist liberals 
such as Ralph Nader and pro-business economists such as Alfred Kahn, who was the 
chairman of the CAB in the late 1970s. In 1977, Jimmy Carter made the deregulation of 
air transport the subject of his presidential campaign. After several studies and despite 
many skeptics, the Airline Deregulation Act was enacted in 1978 providing for the 
phasing out of all of the CAB’s activities by 1984.  
The quick domestic deregulation has led to the virulent re-organization of the 
American airline service industry, which most observers describe as “chaotic and even 
frightening.”13 Especially during the recession years of 1979 and 1980, airlines and the 
                                            
12 Interview in Brussels on November 26, 2002. 
13 Tarry, Scott E., 2000: Globalization and the Prospect of Policy C nvergence in Air Transport. In: 
Global Society 14/2, 279-296. 
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communities they served were no longer guaranteed anything and several large and small 
airlines went bankrupt. Nonetheless, the 1978 Act opened the domestic market to new 
market entrants, increased the number of routes served, and lowered the fares. At the 
time, it was the first thorough dismantling of an entire system of government control of 
an industry since WWII, and it is now considered a success.14  
Eager to apply the new solutions to its own air service industry, the United Kingdom 
deregulated the sector in a similar manner under the Thatcher government in 1979. Both 
the UK and the Netherlands had always had a somewhat less restrictive air transport 
policy than the rest of Europe.15 In most other European countries, by contrast, national 
control over the airlines was deeply rooted. Although the specific models varied, most 
countries had very protectionist policies regarding what was considered a public service 
sector monopoly. Throughout Europe, individual governments held a majority stake or 
had total control of their national “flag carrier” airlines.  
The U.S. experience did little to change this, even though European carriers were 
operating at a loss. However, it did spark the interest of EU officials and of several 
national officials from the more liberal member states, who wanted to apply the 
principles of the common market to intra-European aviation as well.
The first two Commission memoranda on aviation in 1979 and 1984 received a frosty 
reception from national governments and airlines alike. D pite the lack of interest in an 
EU-wide solution, a 1984 agreement between the UK and the Netherlands allowed any 
airline in either country to operate between the two without the need to seek further 
government approval. With the two countries in favor of further liberalization, the 
Commission continued pursuing the idea of an EU-wide approach through what has been 
called a “stick and carrot approach.”16  
On the one hand, the Commission exploited an ECJ ruling, the Nouvelles Frontières 
decision, to apply pressure on the reluctant member states. The Nouvelles Frontières 
decision of 1986 annulled a French judgment against a number of private airlines and 
travel agencies operating in France. These had been accused of violating the French Civil 
Aviation Code by selling cheap, non-approved tickets. The ECJ ruled in favor of these 
agencies, arguing that the price-fixing mechanisms of the French Civil Aviation Code 
distorted competition within the EU and were therefore incompatible with the 
competition law in the EC. Based on this decision, the Commission called upon all 
European airlines following similar procedures to abandon their activities. Although this 
would have been impossible, the pressure that was applied to these governments 
augmented the political weight of pro-liberalization forces in France and Germany.  
Be that as it may, positive incentives were necessary as well, as the firm opposition of 
Italy, Greece, Denmark, and Spain threatened to block a unanimous Council decision. 
While the southern countries argued that they did not have the capacities to adjust to the 
increased regional air traffic proposed by the Commission package, Denmark feared that 
                                            
14 Kasper, Daniel M., 1988: Deregulation and Globalization: Liberalizing International Air Services. 
Cambridge, M.A.: Ballinger; Kahn, Alfred E., 1988: I Would Do It Again. In: Re ulation 1988/2. 
15 In particular, both followed a multi-airline policy, negotiating rights for more than just one flag-
carrier on international routes. With a strong consumer lobby, the UK pioneered low cost air travel in the 
1960s and 1970s and was the only country in Europe to establish an independent regulatory authority for 
aviation in 1971. Cf. Kassim, Hussein, 1996: Air Transport. In: Hussein Kassim / Anand Menon (eds.), The 
European Union and National Industrial Policy. London: Routledge, 106- 31. 
16 O’Reilly, Dolores/Alec Stone Sweet, 1998: The liberalization and reregulation of air transport. In: 
Journal of European Public Policy 5/3, 441-466. 
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the changes would unbalance its regional development policies. Brokered by the 
Commission, the governments in favor of the proposal suggested a compromise. The 
regional airports in question in the four countries were to be excluded from liberalization 
during a first stage on liberalization, but further measures could not be delayed in the 
mid-1990s. On the basis of this compromise, an EU-wide agreement on the air transport 
package was reached in late 1987.  
The 1987 package began the transfer of EC authority over EU-wide air transport 
service trade and began a gradual liberalization. Under qualified majority voting 
introduced by the Single European Act, two further packages were adopted in July 1990 
and July 1992. By April 1, 1997, the internal air transport market among the 17 states of 
the European Economic Area (EEA) was completed. By far the most important one, the 
third package transformed national carriers into “community airlines.”17 I  opened up all 
traffic rights to Community airlines, including the freedom to provide cabotage and the 
right to carry passengers or cargo between two points of a country that is not the home 
country of the airline. The system created by the EU was based on the idea of a 
Community license. Any airlines whose capital is held mostly by a Member State or its 
nationals can obtain this license and has automatic access to the Community market. 
Within the EEA market, traffic on all international routes is unrestricted and fares are no 
longer submitted to the national authorities for approval, although some control 
mechanisms persist in special instances and some public service obligations r main.   
Originally an international market, the EEA market resembled the U.S. market from 
1997 onward. The Member States do, however, retain the authority over air traffic control 
and international air service negotiations with non-EEA governments. Currently, the 
harmonization of air traffic control is the subject of another EU proposal called the Single 
European Sky, making external negotiations the only resort of exclusive Member State 
control in European aviation.  
 
 
                                            
17 Mawson, J., 1997: Air Transport Liberalization in the European Union: An Assessment. I : Regional 
Studies 31/8, 807-822. 
 7 
2. LIBERALIZATION OF IN TERNATIONAL AVIATION  
 
In the process of internal deregulation, international aviation also became a target for 
reforms. The most successful policy aimed at liberalizing international aviation are the 
“open skies” agreements started by the United States. The European Union, however, 
considers the bilaterally negotiated open skies agreements biased and insufficient solution 
for global air transport and has been working for some time on ideas for more ambitious 
projects.  
 
2.1. The United States 
The United States set out to reduce international regulation in the late 1970s. A new 
bilateral agreement between the United States and the UK in 1977 – called Bermuda II – 
and a U.S.-Netherlands agreement in March 1978 set the trend for bilateral agreements 
that were less restrictive on the pricing, capacities, and designation rights. Nonetheless, 
airlines remained severely constrained in responding to market volatility and sought new 
solutions, which led to the interconnected developments of strat gic alliances and the 
U.S. policy of “open skies.” 
Strategic alliances 
Experiences in the U.S. domestic market during the 1980s showed that the airlines 
most likely to survive were those that exploited economies of scale. Since consolidation 
beyond national boundaries was impeded by the very strict nationality clauses fixed in 
the bilateral agreements, the seminal response of airlines was to pool their resources. 
With this pooling strategy, airlines can only add destinations to a route network and offer 
increased frequency of services to customers by using its partner’s flight entitlement 
without having to acquire resources. 
The mid-1980s was the high time for mergers, acquisitions, and alliances within the 
domestic U.S. market. Cross-b rder alliances only started in the late 1980s, notably with 
a joint-marketing initiative of Delta, Swissair, and Singapore Airlines. More ambitious 
mergers seemed virtually impossible because of the tight specifications of the bilateral air 
service agreements. The financial difficulties of two American carriers, Northwest 
Airlines and USAir, however, led a loosening of these controls, as foreign investment 
into the ailing airlines seemed one of the few feasible solutions. Political leaders in 
Minnesota and Michigan lobbied the federal government to suppor a deal between 
Northwest and KLM Royal Dutch Airways, while leaders in Pennsylvania and New York 
worked to help secure British Airways investment in USAir.18 The success of these 
agreements is evidenced by the “mega alliances” that exist today.  
Open Skies 
Operating an international alliance could, however, be considered a distortion to fair 
competition and needed to be approved. The fact that cross-border alliances were 
tolerated by the U.S. government was part of a larger policy project. The granting of anti-
trust immunity for an alliance came at the price of opening the market of the airline’s 
country.  
Former principal carriers, such as Trans World Airlines, Pan American, and Eastern 
Airlines had suffered considerably from the restructuring and sold the international routes 
                                            
18 Tarry, Scott E., 2000: Globalization and the Prospect of Policy Convergence in Air Transport. In: 
Global Society 14/2, 279-296. 
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to what became collectively known as the “big three”: United, Delta, and American 
Airlines. Their size and virtual dominance in the U.S. domestic market placed them in an 
excellent position to expand aggressively into foreign markets. However, with the 
exception of a few liberal-minded countries, most foreign governments were not keen on 
the idea of opening their markets to U.S. predators. When the financial difficulties of 
Northwest and US Airways made cross-bo der alliances into the U.S. market attractive to 
foreign carriers, the U.S. government used the opportunity to make the facilitation of 
alliances an integral part of its efforts to open the skies in Europe.  
Since alliances were made with countries that had only one international airline, the 
calculation worked out: what was good for KLM was good for the Netherlands, and so 
the government considered the trade-off a fair one. The first open sky agreement was 
signed between the United States and the Netherlands in September 1992. After a 
package of open sky agreements with smaller European countries, the next important step 
was the open sky agreement with Germany in 1996, with antitrust immunity being 
granted to an alliance between United Airlines and Lufthansa. By the end of the y ar 
2002, 86 open sky agreements had been signed, 59 of them with the United States. While 
the majority of these agreements were again between two countries, one multilateral 
agreement was negotiated between the United States, New Zealand, Singapore, Brunei, 
and Chile in November 2000.19 The agreement is open to new entrants, and several U.S. 
policymakers see the future of international liberalization in similar multilateral open sky 
agreements.20 
 
2.2. Europe  
While the open sky trend is considered very succ ssful by U.S. policymakers and 
airlines, their European counterparts are more skeptical. Despite their considerable 
benefits, bilateral open skies agreements between the United States and 11 of the EU 
member states fall short of complete liberalization, restricting business operations in 
several ways. Most importantly, foreign entities cannot own and control more than 25 
percent of a U.S. carrier (“ownership and control”) or establish a new carrier within the 
United States (“right of establishment”). A foreign carrier cannot provide domestic 
services within the United States (“cabotage”) or lease an aircraft with a crew to a U.S. 
company (“wet-l asing”). Finally, foreign carriers are also excluded from a government 
program that assigns U.S. government perso nel on flights operated by U.S. carriers  
(“Fly America”).  
EU observers therefore feel that the aviation market under the open skies agreements 
is biased, as several of these rights are not restricted within the EU market. For example, 
the United States is the world’s biggest lessor of aircrafts for cargo-oper tions, generating 
more than $1 billion a year from contracts from wet-lease contracts within Europe.21   
Furthermore, the fragmentation of the European market is perceived to be an 
advantageous for U.S. carriers. While European carriers can only fly to the United States 
from their home country, U.S. carriers can fly from any “open skies” EU country to any 
U.S. point. U.S. carriers have also been ceded the right to fly from one open skies country 
in the EU to another, which is effectively a form of cabotage. While it is true that this 
                                            
19 For further information, see http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/apec/opensky.htm.  
20 Interviews in Washington, D.C. on April 10 and 24.  
21 House of Lords, 2003: "Open Skies" or Open Markets? The Effect of the ECJ Judgements on 
Aviation Relations between the EU and the USA. Session 2002-3 17th Report. April 8. London.   
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right is little used by passenger airlines, it does facilitate the cargo operations of U.S. 
cargo airlines within Europe. Most importantly, carriers within the EU can only merge if 
the United States does not refuse to grant the same traffic rights to the new company. 
Over the past decades, for example, British Airways and KLM have talked repeatedly 
about merging. Since BA is considerably larger than KLM, the merger would have been 
primarily British. The open sky agreement with the Uni ed States, however, specified that 
the Netherlands could only designate a company that was 51 percent Dutch. The 
necessary renegotiation of these agreements would then mean that the merger would take 
place if the United States approves it, which often involves other concessions.22 
These imbalances have led the industry within Europe to start thinking about new 
approaches to liberalization. To European airlines, “open skies” seems fundamentally 
biased towards the United States, which has the political clout to negotiate anything they 
want. Even though they do maintain that alliances have been of great benefit to the airline 
industry in Europe, they call it the “crutch” of the existing system, which becomes more 
and more outdated and inappropriate to global airline business operations.23 
In an effort to find a Europe-wid  solution, the Association of European Airlines 
(AEA) proposed a plan for a common aviation area between the United States and 
Europe that would go well beyond open skies. After some initial discussion within the 
EU, the plan for a so-called Transatlantic Common Aviation Area (TCAA) was proposed 
to the United States in 1999.24 As one U.S. observer recalls, the project landed “with a 
thud.” U.S. policymakers and airlines were not very enthusiastic of what they considered 
a very “European” proposal. To the Uni ed States, open skies are a much more promising 
tool for deregulating international air transport. As one policymaker put it, “the TCAA 
proposal had ‘regulation’ written everywhere. We counted the number of times the word 
appeared on the first couple of pages and came to 15!”25 To the U.S. side, it seemed 
counterproductive to work at deregulating international air transport with a ew 
regulation proposal. Even though most participants admit that the proposal stimulated 
some very interesting discussions, they felt that it was not in U.S. interests to move 
forward on what felt like “an invitation to join the European aviation area.”26 
 
 
3. COMMISSION STRATEGY FOR FURTHERING AV IATION INTEGRATION  
 
At the time the meetings occurred in 1999, it was the European Commission, not 
simply AEA, who spoke for European interests on these issues. Since then the 
Commission has relentlessly pursued thi  project. The recent noise around the ECJ ruling 
should be considered part of this objective. In fact, the tensions with the United States 
have worked to help the Commission argue the case for the further integration of 
                                            
22 In this particular case, the Unit d States wanted to use the occasion to renegotiate its access into 
Heathrow airport in London.  
23 Interviews with EU airline representatives on November 27 and December 2, 2002. 
24 AEA, 1995: EU External Aviation Relations. Policy Statement. October. Brussels: A sociation of 
European Airlines. <http://www.aea.be/Topics&Views/downloads/EU_EXT_AVrel.pdf>; AEA, 1999: 
Towards a Transatlantic Common Aviation Area. Policy Statement. September. Brussels: Association of 
European Airlines. <short version: http://www.aea.be/Topics&Views/downloads/tcaa.htm> 
25 Interviews in Washington, D.C. on April 2 and 10, 2003.  
26 Interview with a U.S. government representative on April 10, 2003.  
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aviation. The following section lays out the motivation for the activism of the European 
Commission throughout this process. 
 
3.1. Integrating Europe 
At the beginning of the move towards an external negotiating mandate were two 
distinct interests. For one, the European Commission wanted t compl te the internal 
aviation market that it had created throughout the 1990s and was kept from doing so by 
the constraints of the existing regulatory framework of international aviation. Several 
major European airlines also felt that the existing system hinder d important 
developments in European aviation, most importantly the consolidation of a nationally 
fragmented system. When they realized that the Commission wanted to become active on 
the issue, the jumped at the occasion to get involved in order to maintain some say in 
what they considered a very important policy development. While the Commission could 
provide policy relevance to AEA’s proposals, the airline association provided legitimacy 
to the Commission’s project – two ingredients that made the coalition last until today.  
In the process of air transport integration within Europe, the European Commission 
considered from very early on the possible benefits of negotiation authority over aviation 
agreements with third countries, most notably the United States. When the Commission 
expressed these ideas, the European airlines quickly reacted. In June 1995, AEA 
submitted comments to the EU Member States and the Commission on the request for an 
external mandate. Only several month later, by October 1995, AEA had written a very 
detailed proposal on what they felt should be negotiated through an EU-U.S. avi tion 
agreement, which they called a transatlantic common aviation area. 
The TCAA project was very innovative and might have been a reaction to a very 
short-lived discussion on a World Trade Organization (WTO) solution for global air 
transport liberalization. Most European airlines preferred a regionally specific 
arrangement to a more global approach through the WTO, because such an agreement 
must be negotiated in detail. Several major European airlines realized that an EU external 
aviation policy could be beneficial if it would help to “maximize [airlines’] growth, 
economic viability, and competitiveness.”27 The rationale behind the AEA’s proposal was 
the need for consolidation within Europe. For the Commission, the demands of the AEA 
highlighted the incompleteness of the internal aviation market. While free movement and 
free right of establishment should be a natural business operation of Community carriers, 
the designation article in air service agreements blocked this possibility. Even though the 
AEA statement underlined that the EU had yet to prove the “added value” of an EC 
solution, the project corresponded to the interests of the European Commission and was 
quickly adopted as a transport policy objective.28  
National governments were much less convinced. Each government had an 
experienced staff of external negotiators who have dealt with the issue for a very long 
time. Of the 2054 bilateral air serviceagreements in place, almost 1500 were operated by 
EU Member States. Since most agreements were not “open sky” agreements, regular 
meetings with the partner governments were needed to re- valua e frequency, 
                                            
27 AEA, 1995: EU External Aviation Relations. Policy Statement. October. Brussels: Association f 
European Airlines. <http://www.aea.be/Topics&Views/downloads/EU_EXT_AVrel.pdf> 
28 An overview of the Commission’s objectives for international air transport can be found on its 
website:  http://europa.eu.int/comm/transport/air/international/index_en.htm. 
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designations, and other issues of concern.29 Even though the European Commission did 
start a sub-unit in the Directorate General for Transport and Energy (DG TREN) that 
dealt with issues of bilateral air service negotiations, most EU Member States felt the 
Commission was understaffed and not well experienced in this domain.30  
 
3.2. Overcoming opposition 
Eager to overcome the doubts expressed by national governments, the European 
Commission prepared another “carrot and stick” approach similar to the one used in the 
integration of internal aviation. On the one and, they reoriented their demands towards 
distinct types of external mandates, insisting mainly on the one that would apply to the 
United States, and commissioned a study of the benefits of a common EU solution. On 
the other hand, they seized the ECJ to press legally for their vision. That radical 
interpretation of the decision and harsh rhetoric against the United States were a further 
means of pressing their cause.  
Even though the Commission might in theory be interested in all types of bilateral 
negotiations, the clearest benefit would be for negotiations with the United Stat s.31 
Relaying on the TCAA concept, the Commission and AEA argued publicly that the U.S. 
open sky policy did not create a level playing field. Only if the European countries spoke 
up with one voice could this disequilibrium be overcome. The idea of a TCAA permitted 
the Commission furthermore to argue the need for a “new” solution, not just a 
multilateral open sky agreement that would still have Member States at the negotiation 
table. 
On a more aggressive note, the Commission also argued that the old bilateral 
agreements, and, most importantly, the nationality clause were in conflict with the 
concept of a Community carrier established through the third liberalization package voted 
on by the Council of Ministers. As it turned out, free right of establishment and cabotage 
within Europe meant little to carriers that operated international flights. The only airlines 
to fly service between two points of another member state or established themselves 
outside of the country that they were owned by were European low cost carriers such as 
Ryanair or Easy Jet – who fly, for example, between Paris and Nice. In December 1998, 
the European Commission brought seven cases against the open sky agreements of
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, and Sweden and an eighth 
against the bilateral “Bermuda II” agreement between the United Kingdom (UK) and the 
United States in December 1998.32 A second batch was later brought to the ECJ against 
countries that had concluded open sky agreements with the United Stat s after that date.  
During the years that the ECJ decision was pending, the Commission continued to 
work up a consensus on a EU-U.S. agreement within the EU Member States. They also 
traveled to Washington, D.C. to meet with their U.S. counterparts to discuss the existing 
proposals. Even though the U.S. side was quite intrigued by the proposal, they found it 
                                            
29 House of Lords, 2003: "Open Skies" or Open Markets? The Effect of the ECJ Judgements on 
Aviation Relations between the EU and the USA. Session 2002-3 17th Report. April 8. London.  
30 Interviews with government and airline representatives in the EU on November 18, 27, December 2 
and 5, 2002. 
31 Cf. http://europa.eu.int/comm/transport/air/international/index_en.htm.  
32 In October 1999, the Netherlands decided to join the Court cases in support of the other Member 
States. 
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“overly ambitious” and “very European.”33 Several propositions, such as the 
harmonization of competition law or a change in ownership requirements, would 
furthermore require statutory change in the United States and had little to no chance of 
passing in Congress.34 With the lack of real negotiating power on the European side, the 
United States therefore just shrugged its shoulders and told the Europeans to come back 
when they had a mandate. Faced with the doubts of their Member States and the 
resistance of the United States, DG TREN commissioned a study on the benefits of an 
open aviation area between the EU and the Uni ed States from a U.S. consultancy, the 
Brattle Group.35  
On November 5, 2002, the ECJ finally issued the ruling on the first batch of air 
service agreements, ruling that the nationality clause and several other areas covered by
the open sky agreements were issues of exclusive competence of the European 
Commission, even though external negotiations remained in the competence of the 
Member States. The question immediately arose as to how the articles in question should 
be brought into conformity with Community law. Judging by the radical statements 
issued by the Commission, they wanted to assure that they would be part of a solution. In 
a first communication dated November 19, 2002, the Commission therefore called upon 
the Member States to denounce existing operations under the agreements in question. In a 
second communication on February 26, 2003, it modified its position, arguing that it was 
necessary to distinguish between the infringements and the need for a wider mandate.36 In 
an effort to structure the discussion, it also clearly distinguished between different kinds 
of requests:  (1) a specific mandate to negotiation an Open Aviation Area with the United 
States; (2) a horizontal mandate for international negotiations in those areas considered 
Community competence; and (3) a procedure for coordination and information on 
international negotiations between the Commission and the Member States.  
For the United States, these issues seemed very different. While the wider mandate 
seemed a long-term issue for the United States, it was concerned about the continuation 
of their current transatlantic operations. The U.S. government therefore organized a 
meeting with several representatives of the EU Member States in Paris in late February 
2003 and proposed what they thought were appropriate remedies to the articles found 
problematic by the ECJ. As a U.S. participant remarked, “the meeting was very lively 
until a representative of DG TREN ‘crashed the party.’” The Commission had decided to
participate in the meeting, which “put a chill on the discussion.”37 A cordi g to the 
Commission, the Member States very wisely refused to enter into negotiations on an 
issue in which the competences were either unclear or very definitely belonged to the
European Commission, as was the case with the nationality clause.38  Whi e the 
Commission was thoroughly displeased with the U.S. efforts to negotiate with the 
Member States individually, the U.S. officials imply did not understand that why the 
Commission would need to be included in a discussion between “sovereign states.”  
                                            
33 Interviews in Washington on April 2 and 10, 2003.  
34 Interviews in Washington on April 10, 24, and May 19, 2003.  
35 It is interesting to note that this study was initially a project of AEA. The Commission soon decided 
that it would be more appropriate for them to adopt this study and ook over the organization.  
36 CEC, 2003: Communication from the Commission on the relations between the Community and third 
countries in the field of air transport. COM (2003) 94 final. February 26. Brussels: European Commission. 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/transport/air/international/doc/com_2003_94_en.pdf> 
37 Interview in Washington, D.C. on April 29, 2003.  
38 Interview in Washington, D.C. on May 15, 2003.  
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This latest clash between U.S. representatives and the European Commission seems 
to be a real case of mismatched understandings of the current state of air transport 
competences within Europe. While the European Commission insists on shared 
competences and demands to be a participant in the discussion, the United States still 
believed that the Member States have exclusive authority over external negotiations. Both 
base their positions  the wording of the ECJ ruling, and looking at the period between 
the ruling and the decision on a negotiating mandate, both positions are defensible.  
 
3.3. The Future  
In the period between which the two communiqués were issued by the European 
Commission, the Brattle Group finished their report on an Open Aviation Area between 
the EU and the United States – the name was changed to dissociate the project from the 
old TCAA.39 While addressing the main concerns of the United States, the report 
estimated tha  economic benefits would fall, especially on the European side. European 
governments have become increasingly interested in the project, since all but four 
European Member States already had open sky agreements with the U ited Sta es and 
felt that a common position would be more beneficial if the market is already open.40 As 
one EU airline representative put it, 
 
We already have an open-sky agreement with the US and we can therefore 
only win from a solution. Everything that we had to give up has been 
given up. We have nothing to lose. That may be an egotistical way of 
looking at it, but it’s pragmatic. It’s is not an ideological undertaking.41 
 
Even the United Kingdom, which had traditionally been very hesitant to enter into 
negotiations of opening their market for fear of opening Heathrow airport, a European 
solution is considered advantageous. As a government representative remarks, “we have 
had such a difficult time negotiating by ourselves with the Americans, the EU can only be 
more successful.”42 A consensus on the European side seems therefore likely. The 
Council of Transport Ministers will meet on June 5-6, 2003 and most observers expect an 
external negotiating mandate, at least for negotiations with the United States, to be 
granted to the Commission at that ime.  
Once the mandate has been granted to the European Commission, the United States 
has affirmed that it is willing to enter into negotiations. However, the United States has 
several reservations towards the project as proposed thus far. European and American 
views diverge considerably with respect to competition law (especially in the context of 
airline aid in the aftermath of 9/11), ownership and control, wet-leasing and cabotage. 
For security reasons and because of labor concerns, none of these issues could be 
substantially changed, particularly not if it required the vote of Congress. The United 
States therefore prefers a less ambitious proposal that would resemble a multilateral open 
                                            
39 Moselle, Boaz et al., 2002: The Economic Impact of an EU-US Open Aviation Area. Study prepared 
for the European Commission. December. Washington, D.C.: The Brattle Group. 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/transport/air/international/doc/brattle_aviation_liberalisation_report.pdf> 
40 Only the UK, Ireland, Spain, and Greece have not concluded open skies with the Unit d States. 
41 Interview on November 18, 2002. 
42 Interview on May 20, 2003. Interestingly, the U.S. observer put it similarly, “after all our frustration 
in negotiating with the British, it cannot be worse with the Commission.”
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sky agreement, precisely what the Europeans do not want. The United Stat s also has 
their own list of items that they consider non-tariff barriers to entry in the EU aviation 
market, such as the Europe-wide ban on night-flights or the access restrictions to 
Heathrow airport.  
A last factor that might play into the U.S. stance is the current crisis in air transport 
within the United States. According to an estimate of the American Air Transport 
Association, the recession, the shock of 9/11, and the reduction in traffic due to the war in 
Iraq will keep the U.S. aviation sector as a whole unprofitable until 2006.43 On the one 
hand, this means that the U.S. government and U.S. carriers are concerned about assuring 
their survival, not about expanding business opportunities.44 On the other hand, the 
proposed aviation area would reduce the foreign ownership restrictions, which is a way of 
assuring new sources of investment into the ailing U.S. sector. As long as no concrete 
investment proposal is on the table, this discussion is somewhat academic, but several 
U.S. policymakers affirmed that the need for foreign investment might raise the interest 
in the EU-U.S. proposal. 
 
4. POLICY RECOMMENDA TIONS 
 
Since negotiation between the EU and the United States will start soon after a 
European mandate is granted to the Commission, this paper ends with some policy 
suggestions for these U.S.-EU meetings.  
For U.S. policymakers, an issue that will need to be taken into account is the changed 
nature of air transport within the EU. This concerns both the nationality clause and right 
of establishment within the EU. Even though the Member States continue to have 
competence over external air service negotiations, they can no longer enter into bilateral 
agreements in the area of ownership and control clauses. The nationality restrictions, in 
turn, constitute the heart of a bilateral agreement, precisely because they are agreements 
between governments. By confirming Community competence over the nationality 
clauses, the ECJ ruling does have implications for the future of bilateral air service 
agreements more generally.45 The judgment also clearly indicates that all Community 
carriers have the right to establish themselves in each other’s territories and to apply for 
international market access like national carriers. Belgium would therefore have to allow 
a Dutch carrier to operate a flight between Brussels and Canada, if there were enough 
frequencies to accommodate the request. The only country that could block the operation 
would be Canada. So far, U.S. policymakers have chosen to ignore this change in t e 
right of establishment principle, because some Member States themselves have in several 
instances refused to grant the right for an international route to the carrier of another 
Member State. While it is true that Member States are not necessarily eager to abide by 
the new standard, they will have to adapt to the changed legal conditions. In a worst-case 
scenario, the Member States might even be pursued internally, within the framework of 
Community jurisprudence.   
                                            
43 ATA, 2003: Airlines in Crisis: the Perfect Economic Storm. March 11. Washington, D.C.: Air 
Transport Association. <http://www.airlines.org/public/industry/bin/AirlinesInCrisis.pdf>  
44 Interviews in Brussels and Washington, D.C. on November 27, 2002 and April 29, 2003.  
45 On this argument, see René Fennes, 2003: “The European Court of Justice Decision on Bilateral 
Agreements – the Future of Relations.” Air and Space Lawyer. 17/3. 14-19. 
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Nonetheless, it is important to distinguish between the two separate objectives the 
European Commission has pursued. The heated rhetoric following the ECJ decision was 
directed at national governments, even though it did address the U.S. open sky 
agreements. The best way of proceeding, as the United States has done so far, is simply 
not to take the most radical statements very literally. 
For the EU policymakers, the most difficult tasks still lie ahead. For the Commission, 
its credibility as an external negotiator will depend on the agreement it will b  able to 
reach with the United States, while the U.S. government will “not be distraught,” as they 
put it, if no agreement is reached.46 It would, therefore, seem wise not to be overly 
ambitious. To the U.S. government, the terms “harmonization” or “convergence” are 
foreign jargon, and U.S. officials are generally quite opposed to the creation of new 
regulatory mechanisms. The Brattle Group report has done very good work in addressing 
the most important U.S. concerns.47 However, as long as the debate rests on the academic 
reflection on necessary elements of a deregulated aviation area, it has little chance of 
moving forward. As several observers confirm, this will only go somewhere “if there is a 
concrete proposal that benefits business.”48 Thi  will especially be the case if changes 
requiring the approval of Congress arise. With financial lobbying being restricted to U.S. 
nationals only, Congress might only be swayed if U.S. carriers and the communities 
served are behind the project. While several large U.S. carriers today agree that a reform 
of ownership and control requirements, for example, might be beneficial, a solid base of 
U.S. support for the project will need to be one of the European Commission’s objectives 
throughout the negotiations. It is unlikely that this support will materialize in the near 
future.   
 
 
                                            
46 Interviews in Washington, D.C. on April 24 and 29, 2003.   
47 Most U.S. policymakers that I questioned specifically on this issue find it a very good piece of 
academic writing.  
48 Interviews with U.S. government and airline representatives on April 10, 29, May 19. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
From a Washington perspective, what is at stake is a potentially interesting attempt to 
negotiate a common aviation area between the EU and the United States. For the 
European Commission, it is much more. External negotiations with the United States not 
only provide the basis of more flexible business operations in transatlantic aviation, they 
also imply the completion of the internal European aviation market and an increased 
policy competence for the Commission itself.  
The diplomatic difficulties between the European Commission and U.S. policymakers 
and carriers result from these divergent interests. Moreover, the European Commission 
has employed a conscious strategy of defining its goals against the U.S. objectives in 
order to rally the European Member States behind its proposals. The arguments against 
U.S. influence on European aviation were part of a two-fold po er play. Economically, 
the Commission – joined by AEA – aims at creating a “more leveled playing field” for its 
aviation industry. By proposing a common aviation area between the EU and the United 
States, it hopes to overcome the disadvantages of the nationally fragmented transatlantic 
market and to move beyond the U.S. policy of open skies. Institutionally, the European 
Commission played a power game against its own Member States. Through reference to 
the economic interests and the opposition of the United States, as well as the utilization of 
the ECJ, it was able to m ve very close to being granted new competences.  The 
European Commission has almost won the institutional game over new competences. The 
economic game in which it is engaged with the United States, however, is only 
beginning.   
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